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Counterfactual conditionals are frequently used in language to express potentially valid
reasoning from factually false suppositions. Counterfactuals provide two pieces of
information: their literal meaning expresses a suppositional dependency between an
antecedent (If the dice had been rigged. . . ) and a consequent (. . . then the game
would have been unfair ). Their second, backgrounded meaning refers to the opposite
state of affairs and suggests that, in fact, the dice were not rigged and the game
was fair. Counterfactual antecedents are particularly intriguing because they set up a
counterfactual world which is known to be false, but which is nevertheless kept to
when evaluating the conditional’s consequent. In the last years several event-related
potential (ERP) studies have targeted the processing of counterfactual consequents,
yet counterfactual antecedents have remained unstudied. We present an EEG/ERP
investigation which employed German conditionals to compare subjunctive mood (which
marks counterfactuality) with indicative mood at the critical point of mood disambiguation
via auxiliary introduction in the conditional’s antecedent. Conditional sentences were
presented visually one word at a time. Participants completed an acceptability judgment
and probe detection task which was not related to the critical manipulation of linguistic
mood. ERPs at the point of mood disambiguation in the antecedent were compared
between indicative and subjunctive. Our main finding is a transient negative deflection
in frontal regions for subjunctive compared to indicative mood in a time-window of
450–600ms. We discuss this novel finding in respect to working memory requirements
for rule application and increased referential processing demands for the representation of
counterfactuals’ dual meaning. Our result suggests that the counterfactually implied dual
meaning is processed without any delay at the earliest point where counterfactuality is
marked by subjunctive mood.
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INTRODUCTION
Counterfactual conditionals are frequently used in everyday lan-
guage to convey potential dependencies between antecedents
and consequents which have never been realized. A coun-
terfactual conditional “If Horst had not bought a pony, he
would be miserable” expresses a positive relation between
Horst (suppositionally) not buying a pony and his (sup-
positional) misery. However, most people are able to infer
from this sentence that Horst did in fact buy a pony (and
is not miserable at all), even in absence of prior informa-
tion about Horst (Thompson and Byrne, 2002). This notion
of a dual meaning (suppositional and factual) has made the
topic of counterfactual conditionals interesting for philoso-
phers, linguists and psychologists alike and accounts for increas-
ing attention of neurocognitive and psycholinguistic research
on counterfactual sentence processing (Ferguson et al., 2008;
Van Hoeck et al., 2010, 2012, 2013; Nieuwland and Martin,
2012; Nieuwland, 2012a,b; Urrutia et al., 2012; Kulakova et al.,
2013).
In this recent line of neuroscientifically informed language
research, counterfactual conditionals have been characterized by
past tense and subjunctive mood. It has been argued before
that it is primarily the pragmatics of subjunctive mood that
marks the antecedent (i.e., the if -part) of the counterfactual
conditional as factually false (Stalnaker, 1975). The subjunctive
mood signals an inconsistency between the antecedent and the
interlocutors’ factual world knowledge. In contrast, the use of
indicative mood (“If Helga got a cat, then she is happy now.”)
in conditionals suggests compatibility between world knowl-
edge and the proposition expressed by the antecedent. Helga
might have bought a cat, or not, we don’t know. Thus, even
if the hearer does not already know the conflicting facts tar-
geted by the counterfactual antecedent, she can infer them from
the speaker’s use of subjunctive mood. The factual informa-
tion conveyed by counterfactuals (i.e., counterfactual antecedent
falsity) has initially been identified as a presupposition phe-
nomenon (Levinson, 1983; Fauconnier, 1994), although alterna-
tive accounts in terms of presuppositional and scalar implicatures
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have been presented recently (Verstraete, 2008; Leahy, 2011). All
accounts agree that a pragmatic inference process is initiated to
arrive at the (backgrounded) factual meaning of a counterfactual
antecedent.
In a cognitive semantic form, the dual representation of coun-
terfactuals was described within the mental spaces framework of
Fauconnier (1994). Fauconnier introduces the concept of men-
tal spaces, domains which are used to represent our mental
(or subjectively accessible) representation of linguistic content.
Counterfactual conditionals are considered as space builders,
introducing new spaces as they go. Crucially, the parent space
(usually representing the real world) and the counterfactually
triggered mental space must contain incompatible information.
The mental spaces account of counterfactuals captures the intu-
itive subjective experience during counterfactual sentence pro-
cessing. However, it is difficult to approach the implications of
this framework in an experimental manner. For example, the the-
ory does not indicate whether a counterfactual is more difficult
or costly to process than a sentence which does not open a new
mental space. Furthermore, it does not indicate at which point of
incremental sentence processing the counterfactual mental space
is built up and for how long it is up-held.
Studies of online sentence processing have shown that subjects
rapidly represent the factual state of affairs implied by counter-
factual conditionals. Subjunctive but not indicative conditionals
(If A then B) were shown to prime the implied factual event
(¬A and ¬B), resulting in reading time benefits for its subsequent
presentation (Santamaría et al., 2005). An eye-tracking study pre-
sented either counterfactual conditionals (If the racing driver had
won the race, . . . ) or factual sentences (Because the racing driver
had won the race, . . . ) as a context manipulation followed by either
consistent or inconsistent declarative sentences (Ferguson, 2012).
Importantly, the counterfactual continuation (In the evening the
racings driver’s team celebratedinconsistent/commiseratedconsistent)
was either consistent or inconsistent with the implied factual
information of the preceding counterfactual. The fact that sub-
jects detected the inconsistency in the counterfactual condition
(as indexed by more first-pass regressions out and back into the
critical regions and longer total reading times of the pre-critical
region) shows that subjects had access to the implied factual
meaning of the counterfactual.
During the recent years an increasing amount of Event-
Related Potential (ERP) studies has targeted counterfactual
sentence processing. The neurocognitive approach to counter-
factuals has primarily focused on the semantic N400 effect of
world-knowledge violation in factual compared to counterfac-
tual contexts (Ferguson et al., 2008; Nieuwland andMartin, 2012;
Nieuwland, 2012a,b). Nieuwland and Martin (2012) demon-
strated that the processing effort of a counterfactual consequent
(as indexed by the N400 amplitude elicited by a critical word) is
modulated by its consistency with the conditionals’ antecedent
rather than general world knowledge. This finding was further-
more demonstrated to hold for absolutely absurd consequences
(If dogs had gills, Dobermans would breathe under water). The
ERP elicited at the critical word was comparable to a factually
true sentence (Because fishes have gills, tuna breathe under water).
However, a pronounced N400 effect emerged at the critical
word when the licensing counterfactual antecedent was omit-
ted (Nieuwland, 2012b). This suggests that the (factually false)
propositions expressed by counterfactual antecedents are quickly
incorporated into the discourse, licensing subsequent conclusions
which are factually false but consistent with a locally established
context.
These results taken together suggest that both the factual and
suppositional meaning of a counterfactual are accessed rapidly,
as expected from a double representation account. If this is true,
it should be possible to observe effects of increased processing
costs arising from the dual counterfactual representation at the
point of linguistic mood disambiguation, since counterfactuality
is for the first time marked by subjunctive mood use in the condi-
tionals’ antecedent. However, to our knowledge no study has yet
investigated the immediate effect of counterfactuality introduc-
tion in the antecedent of a counterfactual conditional. The reason
why research has neglected counterfactual antecedents process-
ing for a long time may lie in the fact that until now ERP studies
of counterfactuals have relied on factual “Because . . . ” construc-
tions as the contrast conditions for counterfactuals, which makes
it difficult to interpret any effect at the auxiliary because up to
the critical point sentences already differ in length and word-
ing. A recent proposal from imaging research on counterfactual
sentence processing suggests that the hypothetical conditional as
marked by indicative mood provides a more appropriate con-
trol condition, paralleling the counterfactual in the suppositional
ontological status as well as the If-then structure (Kulakova et al.,
2013). The only remaining difference between these conditions is
linguistic mood, introducing the counterfactuals’ antagonism to
factual events (see also Stewart et al., 2009).
In the present study we investigated the neural consequences
of counterfactuality introduction in the antecedent of German
conditionals. We compared the ERPs elicited by auxiliary verbs
(i.e., grammatical entities that carry information about linguistic
mood) marking subjunctive and indicative mood. To our knowl-
edge this was the first attempt to experimentally pinpoint the
process of counterfactuality marking in a subjunctive antecedent.
We used an electroencephalographic (EEG) measure which is
very sensitive to fast, automatic, and unconscious processes dur-
ing sentence processing and provides detailed information about
the time-course of neuronal events. We expected to observe an
ERP difference reflecting the process of counterfactual implica-
tion detection leading to a dual representation in subjunctive
compared to indicative mood.
Opposite to the English language, German allows the imple-
mentation of this comparison in a very straightforward way.
Subjunctive mood in past tense has a distinct morphology that,
contrary to English, does not comprise a double layer of past tense
which inevitably results in sentence length differences. Another
advantage of German syntax that facilitates the investigation of
mood-disambiguation at this early point comes from the fact that
the mood-disambiguating auxiliary takes the final position in the
antecedent where propositional content is already conveyed. See
an example of our stimulus material in Table 1. Both conditions
are identical in the first four words which set up the suppositional
proposition of rigged dice (Wenn die Würfel gezinkt . . . ). The
next word is the auxiliary verb which introduces linguistic mood:
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Table 1 | Example of German stimulus sentences (critical word
underlined) with literal and analogous English translations.
Subjunctive (counterfactual)
Wenn die Würfel gezinkt wären, dann wäre das Spiel fair/unfair.
If the dice rigged weresubjunctive, then would be the game fair/unfair.
“If the dice had been rigged, then the game would have been fair/unfair.”
Indicative
Wenn die Würfel gezinkt waren, dann war das Spiel fair/unfair.
If the dice rigged wereindicative, then was the game fair/unfair.
“If the dice were rigged, then the game was fair/unfair.”
In the counterfactual condition “wären” marks subjunctive mood
and allows the reader to infer that although it is supposed that the
dice were rigged (suppositional meaning), they in fact were not
(factual meaning). In the indicative condition “waren” introduces
the suppositional reading only, allowing no inferences about the
factual state of affairs.
We incorporated our experimental manipulation of linguis-
tic mood in an acceptability judgment and probe detection task,
so that consciously inferring the counterfactually implied fac-
tual information was not required for correct task performance.
This was intended in order to investigate the automatic (i.e., task-
irrelevant) effect of counterfactual sentence processing occurring
at the point of mood disambiguation via the introduction of the
auxiliary in the conditionals’ antecedent. We used German con-
ditional sentences describing causal and definitional regularities
which have been demonstrated to trigger a counterfactual read-
ing when presented in subjunctive mood (Thompson and Byrne,
2002). We measured ERPs elicited at the critical antecedent-final
auxiliary but also report the effects of the sentence-final manip-
ulation of truth. Since the targeted process of counterfactuality
processing was semantic/pragmatic in nature we did not expect
to observe the critical effect to occur early, but rather in time-
window where effects of semantic manipulations (i.e., N400,
LAN, P600) are usually reported. Potential effects of visual dis-
similarity of the compared auxiliaries should, if occurring at all,
manifest in rather early differences starting at around 150ms post
onset (Sauseng et al., 2004).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Sixteen German native speakers (7 female; mean age 23.5; age
range 18–36 years) participated in the ERP study. All subjects
were right-handed according to an adopted German version
of the Edinburgh Inventory (Oldfield, 1971) and had normal
or corrected-to-normal vision. Subjects gave informed consent
before the experiment and were paid 20C for participation. All
methods conformed to the Code of Ethics of the World Medical
Association (Declaration of Helsinki) (see Mayrhauser et al.,
2014).
MATERIALS
Stimulus material consisted of 52 sets of German condition-
als describing social, physical or biological regularities. The
experimental factor of interest was MOOD (two levels: indica-
tive, subjunctive). Furthermore, the sentence-final content word
varied as a function of TRUTH (two levels: true, false) in order to
balance acceptability. Two auxiliary verbs forms, haben (to have)
and sein (to be), were used in equal amounts to make the stim-
uli less monotonous. Their past tense plural forms are visually
maximally similar between past indicative and subjunctive (hat-
ten/hätten, waren/wären), only differing in the diacritic umlaut
on the first vowel. Since this could have added an effect of aux-
iliary due to possible differences in naturalness, cloze or word
frequency effects, we carried out additional tests to specify these
parameters and also included auxiliary type (factor AUX, two lev-
els: to be, to have) in further analyses. Each of the 52 thematic
vignettes was presented twice per subject in different counter-
balanced conditions, resulting in 104 items in total. Additionally,
the experiment contained 208 declarative (non-conditional) filler
sentences which were also balanced in acceptability (e.g., No
vegetarian likes eating roast/vegetables).
Naturalness rating
To investigate possible effects of perceived naturalness, we con-
ducted a rating-task of our stimulus material in respect to the
four auxiliaries employed. In an internet-based survey 50 partic-
ipants (none of which took part in the EEG-experiment) rated
the auxiliaries of the antecedents (consequents were not presented
to avoid confounding effects of plausibility) for their natural-
ness on a 7 point scale. A 2× 2 repeated measures ANOVA with
the factors MOOD and AUX revealed a main effect of MOOD
[F(1, 48) = 163.2, p < 0.001] and a MOOD × AUX interaction
[F(1, 48) = 14.7, p < 0.001]. Resolving the interaction by AUX
indicated that naturalness ratings were higher for subjunctive
both for “to be” [T(48) = 4.6, p < 0.001] and “to have” [T(48) =
12.8, p < 0.001]. See Table 2 for detailed behavioral results.
Completion task
We also tested predictability differences between indicative and
subjunctive auxiliaries employed in our task. In an internet-
based survey a cohort of 58 subjects (none of which took part
in the EEG-experiment or carried out the naturalness rating)
completed 30 randomly selected sentences from our stimulus
material truncated before the critical auxiliary. The subjunctive
past tense continuation was chosen with a mean probability
of 0.13, the indicative past auxiliary was almost never chosen
(<0.01). Instead, subjects chose the more colloquial future or
present indicative forms of the respective auxiliary, but no other
word forms. See Table 2 for detailed cloze values. Table 2 also
presents the frequencies (per million) of the employed auxiliaries
derived from the SUBTLEX-DE database (Brysbaert et al., 2011).
PROCEDURE
Trials began with a fixation cross presented for 1500ms. After
900ms blank screen, sentences were presented word-by-word
with a single word duration of 400ms (nominal phrases 500ms)
and an inter-stimulus interval of 200ms. The critical words
were presented with a comma, the last word of each sentence
was presented with a period. Each sentence was followed by an
acceptability judgment where a green question mark prompted
subjects to give a yes/no acceptability judgment. This was
followed by a probe detection task in which subjects judged if a
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Table 2 | Stimulus properties and behavioral results split by mood (indicative/subjunctive) and auxiliary (to be/to have).
Indicative Subjunctive
To be To have To be To have
Frequency 711 363 166 242
Naturalness 4.1 (1.7) 3.5 (1.2) 5.3 (1.4) 5.7 (0.8)
Cloze 0 0 0.08 0.18
Acceptability judgment True % accepted 95.1 (7) 95.1 (7) 94.7 (8) 93.1 (7)
RT in ms 577 (245) 712 (260) 620 (286) 712 (245)
False % accepted 4.4 (7) 3.5 (7) 5.7 (8) 4.2 (11)
RT in ms 606 (289) 742 (308) 730 (326) 724 (341)
Probe detection True % detected 96.9 (5) 99.6 (2) 98.7 (3) 99.0 (4)
RT in ms 884 (243) 853 (254) 852 (233) 946 (290)
False % detected 99.5 (2) 99.1 (2) 98.4 (3) 99.5 (2)
RT in ms 922 (314) 994 (234) 1026 (300) 945 (248)
Frequencies per million, offline ratings of naturalness (N = 50) and cloze probability (N = 58). Online acceptability and probe detection responses (N = 16) with
corresponding reaction times (RT) for true and false sentences. Standard deviations are given in parentheses.
single displayed word had been presented in the previous sen-
tence. Maximal response duration for each task was 2000ms.
Participants responded by pressing the left or right shift-key
on a computer keyboard. The assignment of response buttons
was counterbalanced across participants. Inter-trial interval was
800ms. Experimental and filler sentences (312 trials in total) were
pseudo-randomized and presented in 6 blocks with 52 different
items per block. Half of the participants read the sentences in
reverse order to control for sequence effects.
EEG RECORDING AND PREPROCESSING
EEG was recorded from 25 Ag/AgCl electrodes mounted in
an elastic cap (Easy Cap International, Herrsching-Breitbrunn,
Germany) according to the 10/20 system (Jasper, 1958).
Electrodes included: AFz, Fz, FCz, Cz, CPz, Pz, POz, F7/8, F3/4,
FC5/6, FC1/2, CP5/6, CP1/2, P7/8, P3/4, O1/2. The EEG-signal
was sampled at 500Hz with a low-pass filter at 250Hz and a soft-
ware notch filter (50Hz). Data were recorded with respect to the
left mastoid reference and electrode AFz served as ground elec-
trode. The horizontal electro-oculogramm (HEOG) was recorded
from electrodes at the outer canthus of each eye. The verti-
cal electro-oculogramm (VEOG) was recorded from electrodes
placed above and beneath the left eye. Scalp impedances were kept
below 5 k.
Offline, all electrodes were re-referenced to the average activity
of the left and right mastoids, before an independent compo-
nent analysis (ICA) was applied to correct ocular artifacts. After
correction, remaining artifacts (EOG, movement, technical) were
marked manually. In total, 5.1% of indicative 7.7% of subjunctive
trials had to be rejected. The signal was band-pass filtered from
0.3–20Hz in order to exclude slow drifts and then was segmented
into epochs from −300 to 800ms around the critical words.
The signal was averaged for each condition and each participant
before grand averages were computed across all participants.
For the statistical analysis of acceptability and probe detec-
tion, mean acceptability (% accepted) and probe detection
accuracy (% detected) and the corresponding reaction times
were subjected to repeated measure ANOVAs with the factors
MOOD (indicative/subjunctive), TRUTH (true/false) and AUX (to
have/to be).
Based on visual inspection statistical analyses of the ERPs were
carried out in two time windows: 200–400ms and 450–600ms.
For both time windows the mean amplitude was computed per
subject, condition, and electrode. Mean amplitude values were
submitted to a 2× 2× 6 repeated measures ANOVA with the
factors MOOD, AUX and ROI (regions of interest). The factor
TRUTH was omitted because it played no role at the critical posi-
tion. Six ROIs were calculated from the mean value of three
electrodes each: anterior left (AL; F3, F7, FC5), anterior right
(AR; F4, F8, FC6), central left (CL; FC1, CP1, CP5), central right
(CR; FC2, CP2, CP6), posterior left (PL; P3, P7, O1), and pos-
terior right (PR; P4, P8, O2), see Figure 1 for the topography of
the ROIs. Another 2× 2 × 3 ANOVA was performed with the
factor MID (midline electrodes) where three midline electrodes
were treated as separate ROIs (Fz, Cz, Pz). P-values with more
than one degree of freedom in the numerator were corrected
according to Greenhouse-Geisser. Only significant interactions
were resolved. To disentangle the effects emerging in the statis-
tics pairwise comparisons were computed and are reported at
an FDR-corrected threshold (Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995).
Effects of AUX, ROI, and MID are presented but not discussed
unless there is an interaction with MOOD.
Given the employed target manipulation (Steinhauer and
Drury, 2012) of the critical auxiliary, no systematic differences
between the baseline intervals were expected. Instead of using
a baseline correction which could carry over transient signal
differences from the baseline interval to the critical time win-
dow, we employed a filter which serves to remove unsystematic
pre-stimulus differences due to slow drifts (below 0.3Hz). The
baseline interval was checked for significant differences in steps
of 50ms from −200 to 100ms around the onset of the critical
word to demonstrate the absence of baseline differences.
As a further check of data quality the sentence-final words were
analyzed in the time windows of 300–500ms and 500–800ms
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FIGURE 1 | Topography of the six regions of interest (AL, left anterior;
AR, right anterior; CL, left central; CR, right central; PL, left posterior;
PR, right posterior).
with the expectation to observe an N400/P600 effect commonly
known to reflect semantic violations. All additional analyses are
reported in the Supplementary Material.
RESULTS
BEHAVIORAL RESULTS
Acceptability judgment
Subjects rated true sentences as acceptable and false sentences
as inacceptable. The 2 (MOOD) × 2 (TRUTH) × 2 (AUX)
repeated measures ANOVA revealed only a main effect of TRUTH
[F(1, 15) = 2005.6, p < 0.001] with higher acceptability rates for
true compared to false sentences. The comparison of reaction
times for acceptability ratings showed a main effect of AUX
[F(1, 15) = 26.3, p < 0.001] and a significant AUX×MOOD inter-
action [F(1, 15) = 4.8, p < 0.05]. Resolving the interaction by
AUX indicated that only in the auxiliaries of “to be” subjunctive
mood led to significantly increased reaction times [T(15) = 2.5,
p < 0.05]. A possible reason for this effect is a larger length dif-
ference between indicative and subjunctive sentence-final words
after “to be” (difference of 0.24 characters) than after “to have”
(difference of 0.05 characters).
Probe detection
Performance in the probe detection task was almost perfect.
A 2× 2× 2 repeated measures ANOVA showed neither main
effects nor interactions of the explanatory variables. The anal-
ysis of probe detection speed showed a main effect of TRUTH
[F(1, 15) = 12.2, p < 0.01] and an AUX×MOOD× TRUTH inter-
action [F(1, 15) = 6.7, p < 0.05]. Resolving the interaction by
AUX revealed a significant MOOD × TRUTH interaction for “to
have” [F(1, 15) = 8.8, p < 0.01] but not for “to be” [F(1, 15) = 2.8,
p = 0.11]. Further paired comparisons showed that reaction
times in true “to have” sentences were faster only in indicative
[T(15) = 3.9, p < 0.01] but not subjunctive mood [T(15) < 1].
Detailed behavioral responses with corresponding reaction times
can be found in Table 2.
ERP RESULTS
Detailed test-statistics are shown in Table 3. The 2 (MOOD) × 2
(AUX) × 6 (ROI) repeated measure ANOVA for the lateral elec-
trodes in the 200–400ms time window revealed that subjunctive
mood elicited a significantly more positive deflection compared
to indicative as indicated by amain effect ofMOOD.Midline anal-
yses in the same time window showed significant main effects
of MOOD and MID and a significant AUX × MID interaction.
However, resolving this interaction did not reveal any electrodes
at which the AUX effect reached significance [Fz: T(15) = 1.34,
pFDR = 0.60; Cz/Pz: T(15) < 1].
In the 450–600ms time window the analysis of lateral ROIs
showed main effects of MOOD and ROI and significant MOOD ×
ROI and AUX × ROI interactions. Former indicated that the
stronger negativity elicited by subjunctive mood was most pro-
nounced at left anterior and central electrodes and absent in right
and posterior regions. Resolving the AUX × ROI interaction did
not reveal any ROI which showed a significant effect auf AUX
[AL/CL/CR/PR: T(15) < 1; AR: T(15) = 1.31, pFDR = 0.67; PL:
T(15) = 1.27, pFDR = 0.67]. The midline ANOVA showed a main
effect of MOOD and MID with a significant MOOD × MID and
AUX ×MID interaction. The former indicated a frontal distribu-
tion of the mood effect (i.e., stronger negativity for subjunctive
compared to indicative). Resolving the latter did not disclose any
electrodes at which the effect of AUX reached significance [Fz:
T(15) = 1.12, pFDR = 0.82; Cz/Pz: T(15) < 1]. Figure 2 shows the
grand average ERP waveforms at selected electrode sites for both
levels of the experimental condition MOOD, time locked to the
critical point of mood disambiguation via auxiliary introduction.
The analysis of the sentence-final content word showed a
clear N400/P600 pattern which was expected given our manip-
ulation of truth and the acceptability rating task. None of the
pre-critical time-windows showed effects of MOOD or AUX.
Detailed test-statistics of the additional analyses can be found in
the Supplementary Material.
DISCUSSION
The present ERP experiment examined conditional sentence pro-
cessing at the critical point of linguistic mood introduction in the
antecedent of conditionals. We expected to observe an ERP effect
reflecting the process of counterfactuality marking in subjunctive
compared to indicative antecedents. This implication detection
process is required to establish a dual representation of counter-
factual meaning and was expected to be automatic and thus to
occur in a task which did not involve explicit factual implication
computation. In accordance with our expectations we found a
positive deflection for subjunctive compared to indicative auxil-
iaries in the time-window between 200–400ms, followed by a left
frontal negativity in a time window of 450–600ms.
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Table 3 | Test-statistics of the ERPs elicited by the critical auxiliaries in two time windows.
Time window
200–400ms 450–600ms
ANOVA lateral electrodes df F p sig df F p sig
MOOD 1, 15 26.34 <0.001 *** 1, 15 4.36 <0.05 *
AUX 1, 15 <1 0.97 1, 15 <1 0.96
ROI 5, 75 15.27 <0.001 *** 5, 75 5.58 <0.01 **
AUX ×MOOD 1, 15 <1 0.46 1, 15 1.33 0.27
MOOD × ROI 5, 75 2.46 0.08 5, 75 3.07 <0.05 *
AUX × ROI 5, 75 2.53 0.09 5, 75 3.06 <0.05 *
AUX ×MOOD × ROI 5, 75 <1 0.55 5, 75 1.70 0.18
Resolution by ROI df T pFDR sigFDR
MOOD (AL) 15 3.07 <0.05 *
MOOD (AR) 15 1.89 0.12
MOOD (CL) 15 2.23 0.12
MOOD (CR) 15 1.86 0.12
MOOD (PL) 15 1.36 0.23
MOOD (PR) 15 <1 0.59
ANOVA midline electrodes df F p sig df F p sig
MOOD 1, 15 15.42 <0.001 *** 1, 15 4.70 <0.05 *
AUX 1, 15 <1 0.57 1, 15 <1 0.78
MID 2, 30 19.18 <0.001 *** 2, 30 13.71 <0.001 ***
AUX ×MOOD 1, 15 <1 0.97 1, 15 1.34 0.27
MOOD ×MID 2, 30 1.81 0.19 2, 30 3.90 <0.05 *
AUX ×MID 2, 30 3.89 <0.05 * 2, 30 4.24 <0.05 *
AUX ×MOOD ×MID 2, 30 <1 0.55 2, 30 <1 0.66
Resolution by MID df T pFDR sigFDR
MOOD (Fz) 15 3.58 <0.01 **
MOOD (Cz) 15 1.99 0.10
MOOD (Pz) 15 <1 0.36
Main effects and interactions of the performed ANOVAs and resolution of significant interactions with Mood by region of interest (ROI) and midline (MID) electrodes,
respectively. AUX, auxiliary; AL, anterior left; AR, anterior right; CL, central left; CR, central right; PL, posterior left; PR, posterior right.
PREDICTION-RELATED P300
We interpret the early centro-parietal positivity for subjunctive
relative to indicative auxiliaries as an instance of the prediction-
related P300, since it has a similar time-course and distribution
as described in previous studies (Roehm et al., 2007; Molinaro
and Carreiras, 2010; Vespignani et al., 2010). This ERP compo-
nent has been shown to reflect the integration of an expected
lexical element into the prior context. When there is a successful
match of the predicted and the actual input, a P300 is gener-
ated. Cloze values and naturalness-ratings support the conjecture:
in our stimulus set the subjunctive continuation was anticipated
with a greater likelihood and rated to sound more natural than
the indicative auxiliary. Thus, the antecedent’s context triggered
a significantly stronger expectation of the subjunctive auxiliaries,
the integration of which elicited a P300 effect in comparison to
the less expected indicative auxiliary. This effect arises from the
cloze values of the employed stimuli but should not be replicated
if cloze values between indicative and subjunctive auxiliaries were
matched.
LEFT ANTERIOR NEGATIVITY AND DEFINITENESS
Interestingly, the negative frontal effect for subjunctive vs.
indicative auxiliaries shows that, although locally predicted,
counterfactuals pose increased processing demands. Since lex-
ical prediction presumably does not go beyond semantics, the
pragmatic implication carried by the subjunctive word forms
still required additional processing. The observed transient neg-
ativity from 450–600ms for subjunctive auxiliaries bears topo-
graphical and temporal resemblance to the left anterior neg-
ativity (LAN) effect as often observed for function words as
employed in our study. Generally, the LAN has been proposed
to index increased syntactic working memory demands imposed
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FIGURE 2 | ERP Results. (A) Grand average waveforms time-locked to the antecedent-final auxiliary disambiguating mood: subjunctive (thick line) and
indicative (thin line) mood. (B) Difference maps for the contrast subjunctive > indicative in the relevant time windows illustrate the topography of the effects.
by un-canonical sentence structure (Rösler et al., 1998; Matzke
et al., 2002). Recently, a transient LAN effect was observed for
regular compared to irregular German past participles and was
thus proposed as a marker of syntactic rule application (Krott
and Lebib, 2012). In our task, however, the employed correct
form auxiliaries did not differ functionally between indicative
and subjunctive mood (neither in terms of inflection, conveyed
syntactic complexity nor task demands). Thus, the increased
working-memory demand indexed by the observed negativ-
ity effect is most parsimoniously explained as stemming from
the pragmatic process of counterfactual implication detection,
mirroring the application of a pragmatic rather than syntactic
rule.
A recent finding supports the link between the present results
and the topic of implication detection in terms of presupposi-
tion processing. German definite articles in noun-phrases have
been reported to trigger a significantly stronger negative deflec-
tion than indefinite articles in the time-window of 400–700ms
with a left anterior topography very similar to the one presently
observed (Schumacher, 2009). This effect has been argued to
reflect increased working memory demands for the integration
of a definite referent into discourse. Notably, definite articles and
counterfactuals have both been proposed to be presupposition
triggers (Levinson, 1983), since both elicit a pragmatic inference
process in order to make sense of the use of a specific expression
given the shared beliefs of speaker and hearer. The presupposi-
tion attached to the use of the definite article “the” introduces
the assumption that the referent of the noun following “the”
exists and is contextually salient. This parallels the process by
which subjunctive mood marks the proposition of the antecedent
as false, simultaneously implying its opposite as factually true,
thus referring to a specific factual event. Indefinite articles and
indicative mood, on the other hand, do not convey any definite-
ness about the introduced proposition, and thus lack reference to
any specific discourse entity. Taken together, these results suggest
that the amplitude of the observed negativity is sensitive to the
pragmatic process of counterfactuality marking via implication
detection.
EFFECTS OF FREQUENCY AND CLOZE
Since the frequencies of the employed subjunctive auxiliaries are
generally lower than those marking indicative mood, an effect
of word frequency could be expected to drive our main find-
ing. However, the LAN reported for closed-class words has been
shown to be frequency independent (Brown et al., 1999; Molinaro
et al., 2008). Only one study reported a more pronounced neg-
ativity for very highly frequent compared to high, medium and
low frequency words (Münte et al., 2001). Thus, our results show
if any, then the opposite pattern of a frequency effect. There is
therefore no indication that the negativity effect reported in our
data stems from the frequencies of the employed auxiliaries.
A similar line of argumentation applies to a possible con-
founding effect of cloze value and rated naturalness. Less expected
words are usually associated with a stronger negativity compared
to highly anticipated continuations of a sentence in terms of an
N400 effect (Federmeier et al., 2007). Since in our stimuli the
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indicative auxiliary received lower cloze values and naturalness
ratings our main finding of a stronger negativity for subjunctive
auxiliaries is contrary to an expected effect driven by cloze. Thus,
the confoundation with cloze/naturalness and frequency in our
material rather leads to an underestimation of the observed effect
associated with processing counterfactuals than being an alter-
native explanation for it. Since the N400 is known to be most
pronounced over central and posterior electrode sites (e.g., Kutas
and Federmeier, 2011) such an overlap would be strongest at these
regions and thus could be shifting the observed negativity effect of
counterfactuality toward anterior sites. In this case further studies
with cloze-values matched for mood might find stronger nega-
tivity effects of counterfactuality with broader distributions than
presently observed.
REFERENTIALLY INDUCED FRONTAL NEGATIVITY
Another stance toward the dual meaning of counterfactuals is
referential plurality. Two meanings, one literal suppositional
and the other backgrounded factual, are conveyed at the point
where subjunctive mood suggests a counterfactual reading of
the antecedent’s proposition. Indicative antecedents, on the other
hand, carry only their literal suppositional meaning. This links
the present findings to literature on referential ambiguity where
processing pronouns with more than one definite referent in
the salient discourse space has been shown to elicit sustained
frontal negative shifts emerging at around 300ms after stimulus
onset (Van Berkum et al., 2007). There are three interpreta-
tions of this so called Nref-effect. The negativity could reflect
merely noticing the ambiguity, the attempt to resolve it in terms
of inference processes, or the attempt to simultaneously keep
two competing referential interpretations in working memory, an
interpretation which relates the Nref to the sustained LAN effect
reflecting increased workingmemory demands. Since counterfac-
tuals’ referential plurality probably does not introduce a sustained
ambiguity which has to be resolved at some later point, our find-
ing of a transient negativity for subjunctive auxiliaries might be
related to the Nref but rather represent the identification and
computation of referential plurality of counterfactuals in terms
of their dual meaning.
Taken together, we propose that the increased processing
demand for subjunctive mood as indexed by the observed neg-
ativity effect reflects the process of counterfactuality marking in
terms of implication detection which is relevant for a represen-
tation of the counterfactuals’ dual meaning. This process appears
on an implicit, task-independent level of sentence processing.
N400/P600 EFFECTS OF SEMANTIC ACCEPTABILITY
Although not in the focus of our investigation, we addition-
ally analyzed the ERPs elicited by the sentence-final content
word which established the manipulation of truth in our task.
Behavioral results indicate that the acceptability ratings were
given in accordance to our truth manipulation. Similarly, the
ERPs results show a clear N400/P600 signature for content-words
which rendered the sentence false in comparison to those which
rendered it true. “False” words were semantically incongruent
with preceding context and therefore no contextual facilita-
tion of the lexical entry could be initialized. The N400 reflects
the increased costs of the lexico-semantic acccess of incongru-
ent compared to congruent sentence-final words (Kutas and
Federmeier, 2011). Furthermore, it has been shown that accept-
ability rating tasks make it more likely for semantic violations to
elicit a P600 effect following the N400 (Kuperberg, 2007), which
is what we observe in our data. Our N400 results are consistent
with previous findings of Nieuwland (2012b) and Nieuwland and
Martin (2012) which indicate that the neurocognitive effect of
establishing truth-value in counterfactuals depends on the consis-
tency with the preceding antecedent rather than on general world
knowledge. Consistently, we did not observe any modulation of
the N400 effect by linguisitc mood as indicated by the absence of
an interaction between these factors.
CONCLUSION
Our study is to our knowledge the first investigation of coun-
terfactual antecedents using ERPs. We observed that subjunctive
auxiliaries which mark counterfactuality in antecedents elicited
an early positivity which we interpret as a prediction-related
P300 effect, mirroring the increased expectation of a subjunc-
tive compared to an indicative continuation of the antecedents
in our stimulus set. More importantly, we observed a negativity
effect with a left frontal distribution for subjunctive compared
to indicative auxiliaries in the time-window of 450–600ms. We
propose that this effect indicates increased processing demands
of counterfactual antecedents triggered by the establishing of the
counterfactuals’ dual meaning. Our results demonstrate that the
dual meaning arises without any delay at the earliest point where
counterfactuality is marked.
This result demonstrates the existence of a neural correlate
of subjunctive mood processing. This first evidence of a neural
marker for counterfactuality will allow further studies to explore
the sensitivity to counterfactuality in different contexts and age
groups. The negativity effect may for example serve as a devel-
opmental precursor for counterfactual sentence comprehension
capabilities and should precede children’s ability to reason cor-
rectly from a counterfactual antecedent without committing the
reality bias or resorting to basic conditional reasoning which is
characterized by neglecting the factually implied specific circum-
stances of counterfactuals (Rafetseder and Perner, 2014). Similar
applications are conceivable for patients with lesions or clinical
populations.
An appealing speculation is that the observed negativity effect
is associated with the initiation of inhibitory processes neces-
sary to overcome the reality-bias in counterfactual reasoning.
This would lead to the prediction that the strength of the effect
depends on contextual salience of factually implied events because
more salient stimuli need more inhibition. This motivates sub-
sequent studies which employ absurd counterfactual antecedents
as used by Ferguson and Sanford (2008) or Nieuwland (2012b)
which explicitly violate factual knowledge (e.g., “If dogs had
gills. . . ”), with the expectation to observe even stronger integra-
tion costs. Furthermore, correlational investigations of negativity
amplitude and duration with individual executive function scores
appear promising.
An alternative speculation is that the negativity observed in
our study is an index of a pragmatic violation in terms of a process
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comparable to presupposition failure. The greatest share of liter-
ature reporting a transient LAN (which is, however, followed by a
late positivity which is not observed here) comes from ERP stud-
ies of morpho-syntactic violations (Kutas and Hillyard, 1983).
Although our data do not show a significant late positivity effect
and counterfactual antecedents are rated as sounding rather nat-
ural, it could be tentatively proposed that the use of subjunctive
mood in our materials constitutes a pragmatic violation, since no
contradictory factual knowledge is salient to license its use. In that
case more salient factual events which are implicitly referred to by
the counterfactual antecedent should rather decrease the ampli-
tude of the negativity effect, since they operate as a licensor and
facilitate reference assignment. More studies with manipulations
of context and task that take into account individual difference in
pragmatic sensitivity are required to resolve this interesting issue.
However, all conceivable explanations support an interpreta-
tion of the observed negativity effect for subjunctive antecedents
in terms of a pragmatic effect related to inference processes asso-
ciated with counterfactuality marking in order to arrive at the
counterfactuals’ dual meaning.
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